Books
2023: Hegel and the Problem of Beginning: Pyrrhonian Scepticism and Presuppositionlessness (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield International)
Hegel opens the first book of his Science of Logic with the statement of a problem: "The beginning of philosophy must be either something mediated or something immediate, and it is easy to show that it can be neither the one nor the other, so either way of beginning finds its rebuttal." Despite its significant placement, exactly what Hegel means in his expression of this problem and exactly what his solution to it is, remains unclear.
In this book, Robb Dunphy provides a detailed engagement with Hegel's "problem of beginning", locating it within Hegel's account of significant approaches to the topic of beginning in the history of Western philosophy, as well as making an extended case for the influence of Pyrrhonian Scepticism on the beginning of Hegel's Logic. Dunphy's discussion of the various putative solutions that Hegel might be thought to put forward contributes to debates concerning Hegel's view on the methodology of logic, the relation between his Logic and his Phenomenology of Spirit, and differences between his Encyclopaedia presentation of logic and that of his greater Science of Logic.
Hegel and the Problem of Beginning also functions as a critical commentary on Hegel’s essay, “With what must the beginning of the science be made?” which should be of interest to both researchers and students working on the opening of Hegel’s Logic.
- Reviewed in The Philosophical Quarterly by Nahum Brown here
- Reviewed in The International Journal for the Study of Skepticism by Joris Spigt here
- Reviewed in The Review of Metaphysics by J M Fritzman here
- Reviewed in Hegel-Studien by Hansen Yu here
- Reviewed in the Hegel Bulletin by Miles Hentrup here
2023: Co-edited with Toby Lovat, Metaphysics as a Science in Classical German Philosophy (Abingdon: Routledge)
This volume is dedicated to questions about the nature and method of metaphysics in Classical German Philosophy. Its chapters offer original investigations into the metaphysical projects of many of the major figures in German philosophy between Wolff and Hegel.
The period of Classical German Philosophy was an extraordinarily rich one in the history of philosophy, especially for metaphysics. It includes some of the highest achievements of early modern rationalism, Kant’s critical revolution, and the various significant works of German Idealism that followed in Kant’s wake. The contributions to this volume critically examine certain common themes among metaphysical projects across this period, for example, the demand that metaphysics amount to a science, that it be presented in the form of a system, or that it should proceed by means of demonstration from certain key first principles. This volume also includes material on influential criticisms of metaphysical projects of this kind.
Metaphysics as a Science in Classical German Philosophy is a useful resource for contemporary metaphysicians and historians of philosophy interested in engaging with the history of the methodology and epistemology of metaphysics.
Articles (drafts available on request)
2023: "Schulze's Scepticism and the Rise and Rise of German Idealism" in Metaphysics as a Science in Classical German Philosophy eds. R. Dunphy and T. Lovat (Abingdon: Routledge)
In the context of an account of the role of sceptical challenges in shaping projects aimed at developing a systematic metaphysics after Kant, I examine a number of claims recently defended by Berry to the effect that the full critical force of Schulze's Aenesidemus has not been appreciated among scholars of German Idealism. While agreeing to a limited extent that Pyrrhonian elements of Schulze's scepticism have been downplayed, I offer a partial defence of those German Idealists who took themselves to be responding adequately to the challenges of Aenesidemus.
2023: "Sextus and the Nature of Suspension" Philosophia 51 (4), pp.2241-2259
This article is an investigation of the nature of suspension of judgement as it is conceived by Sextus Empiricus. I carry out this investigation by examining what I take to be Sextus’ most pertinent remarks on the topic and by considering them in the context of contemporary philosophical work on the nature of suspension. Against the more frequently encountered idea that Sextus is operating with a privative conception of suspension, I argue that Sextus instead has a metacognitive account of suspension, whereby suspending constitutively involves acknowledging that one is not in a position to tell whether or not p.
2023: "The Beginning of Hegel's Logic" Philosophy Compass 18 (5), pp.1-10
This article discusses two topics, both commonly referred to using the label “the beginning of Hegel’s Logic”: (1) Hegel’s justification for the claim that a science of logic must begin by considering the concept of “pure being”. (2) Hegel’s discussion of the concepts “being, “nothing”, and “becoming” in the first chapter of his Logic. Discussing recent work on both of these topics, two primary claims are defended: Regarding (1): the strongest interpretations of Hegel’s case for beginning a science of logic with the concept of pure being are those which take him to argue that this concept must be necessarily both “immediate” and “mediated” at the same time. Regarding (2): The widespread tendency to take Hegel’s treatment of the concepts of being, nothing, and becoming as an example with which to illustrate his “dialectical method” should be replaced with an interpretation of that chapter which understands it to rather make possible the kind of dialectical transitions which make up the rest of Hegel’s Science of Logic.
2022: "From Proto-Sceptic to Sceptic in Sextus' Outlines of Pyrrhonism" Apeiron: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science 55 (3), pp.455-484
This is a partial account of Sceptical investigation as it is presented in Sextus Empiricus’ Outlines of Pyrrhonism. I focus my attention of the motivation behind the Sceptic’s investigation, the goal of that investigation, and on the development Sextus describes from proto-Sceptical to Sceptical investigator. I suggest that recent accounts of the Sceptic’s investigative practice do not make sufficient sense of the fact that the Sceptic finds a relief from disturbance by way of suspending judgement, nor of the apparent continuity between proto-Sceptical and Sceptical investigation. I offer an alternative account which turns on the suggestion that the Sceptic accepts that justification is the norm of belief.
2021: "The Scientific Status of Hegel's Logic, its Circular Structure, and the Matter of its Beginning" Revista Eletrônica Estudos Hegelianos 18 (31), pp.45-66
This article is concerned with some of the criteria which Hegel believes apply to a scientific treatment of logic. I briefly address criteria which I take Hegel to inherit from traditional rationalism before focusing on two fairly idiosyncratic criteria: the requirement that a science of logic exhibit a circular structure and that it begin with the concept of pure being. I offer an explanation of these criteria which understands them as motivated by anti-sceptical concerns, before arguing that Hegel’s mature treatment of the latter criterion is problematically ambiguous.
2021: “Hegel and the Problem of Beginning” Hegel Bulletin 43 (3), pp.344-367
In this article I develop an interpretation of the opening passages of Hegel’s essay “With what must the beginning of science be made?” I suggest firstly that Hegel is engaging there with a distinctive problem, the overcoming of which he understands to be necessary in order to guarantee the scientific character of the derivation of the fundamental categories of thought which he undertakes in the Science of Logic. I refer to this as “the problem of beginning”. I proceed to clarify the nature of the problem, which I understand to be motivated by a concern to avoid arbitrariness, and then to detail the nature of Hegel’s proposed solution, which turns on understanding how the concept of “pure being”, understood in a specific sense to be both mediated and immediate, avoids the concerns about arbitrariness which accompany attempts to begin merely with something mediated, or merely with something immediate. On this basis, I offer a number criticisms of alternative approaches to the beginning of Hegel’s Logic.
2020: "Agrippan Problems" – Logos and Episteme 13 (3), pp.259-282
In this article I consider Sextus’ account of the Five Modes and of the Two Modes in his Outlines of Pyrrhonism. I suggest that from these we can derive the basic form of a number of different problems which I refer to as “Agrippan problems”, where this category includes both the epistemic regress problem and the problem of the criterion. Finally, I suggest that there is a distinctive Agrippan problem present at the beginning of Hegel’s Science of Logic.
2020: “On the Incompatibility of Hegel’s Phenomenology with the Beginning of his Logic” Review of Metaphysics 74 (293), pp.81-119
Here I argue that the position taken up at the beginning of Hegel's Logic is constructed in such a fashion that it relies upon the argument of his Phenomenology to justify it. I then offer some support for a view of the relationship between the two texts such as the one supported by Maker in order to see how the two might be thought to be compatible. Finally, in the longest part of the paper, I offer a number of reasons for thinking that attempts to render the two compatible in this fashion fail. I therefore conclude that, as it stands, the beginning of Hegel's Logic is not secured against objection in the way that Hegel wants it to be.
In the context of an account of the role of sceptical challenges in shaping projects aimed at developing a systematic metaphysics after Kant, I examine a number of claims recently defended by Berry to the effect that the full critical force of Schulze's Aenesidemus has not been appreciated among scholars of German Idealism. While agreeing to a limited extent that Pyrrhonian elements of Schulze's scepticism have been downplayed, I offer a partial defence of those German Idealists who took themselves to be responding adequately to the challenges of Aenesidemus.
2023: "Sextus and the Nature of Suspension" Philosophia 51 (4), pp.2241-2259
This article is an investigation of the nature of suspension of judgement as it is conceived by Sextus Empiricus. I carry out this investigation by examining what I take to be Sextus’ most pertinent remarks on the topic and by considering them in the context of contemporary philosophical work on the nature of suspension. Against the more frequently encountered idea that Sextus is operating with a privative conception of suspension, I argue that Sextus instead has a metacognitive account of suspension, whereby suspending constitutively involves acknowledging that one is not in a position to tell whether or not p.
2023: "The Beginning of Hegel's Logic" Philosophy Compass 18 (5), pp.1-10
This article discusses two topics, both commonly referred to using the label “the beginning of Hegel’s Logic”: (1) Hegel’s justification for the claim that a science of logic must begin by considering the concept of “pure being”. (2) Hegel’s discussion of the concepts “being, “nothing”, and “becoming” in the first chapter of his Logic. Discussing recent work on both of these topics, two primary claims are defended: Regarding (1): the strongest interpretations of Hegel’s case for beginning a science of logic with the concept of pure being are those which take him to argue that this concept must be necessarily both “immediate” and “mediated” at the same time. Regarding (2): The widespread tendency to take Hegel’s treatment of the concepts of being, nothing, and becoming as an example with which to illustrate his “dialectical method” should be replaced with an interpretation of that chapter which understands it to rather make possible the kind of dialectical transitions which make up the rest of Hegel’s Science of Logic.
2022: "From Proto-Sceptic to Sceptic in Sextus' Outlines of Pyrrhonism" Apeiron: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science 55 (3), pp.455-484
This is a partial account of Sceptical investigation as it is presented in Sextus Empiricus’ Outlines of Pyrrhonism. I focus my attention of the motivation behind the Sceptic’s investigation, the goal of that investigation, and on the development Sextus describes from proto-Sceptical to Sceptical investigator. I suggest that recent accounts of the Sceptic’s investigative practice do not make sufficient sense of the fact that the Sceptic finds a relief from disturbance by way of suspending judgement, nor of the apparent continuity between proto-Sceptical and Sceptical investigation. I offer an alternative account which turns on the suggestion that the Sceptic accepts that justification is the norm of belief.
2021: "The Scientific Status of Hegel's Logic, its Circular Structure, and the Matter of its Beginning" Revista Eletrônica Estudos Hegelianos 18 (31), pp.45-66
This article is concerned with some of the criteria which Hegel believes apply to a scientific treatment of logic. I briefly address criteria which I take Hegel to inherit from traditional rationalism before focusing on two fairly idiosyncratic criteria: the requirement that a science of logic exhibit a circular structure and that it begin with the concept of pure being. I offer an explanation of these criteria which understands them as motivated by anti-sceptical concerns, before arguing that Hegel’s mature treatment of the latter criterion is problematically ambiguous.
2021: “Hegel and the Problem of Beginning” Hegel Bulletin 43 (3), pp.344-367
In this article I develop an interpretation of the opening passages of Hegel’s essay “With what must the beginning of science be made?” I suggest firstly that Hegel is engaging there with a distinctive problem, the overcoming of which he understands to be necessary in order to guarantee the scientific character of the derivation of the fundamental categories of thought which he undertakes in the Science of Logic. I refer to this as “the problem of beginning”. I proceed to clarify the nature of the problem, which I understand to be motivated by a concern to avoid arbitrariness, and then to detail the nature of Hegel’s proposed solution, which turns on understanding how the concept of “pure being”, understood in a specific sense to be both mediated and immediate, avoids the concerns about arbitrariness which accompany attempts to begin merely with something mediated, or merely with something immediate. On this basis, I offer a number criticisms of alternative approaches to the beginning of Hegel’s Logic.
2020: "Agrippan Problems" – Logos and Episteme 13 (3), pp.259-282
In this article I consider Sextus’ account of the Five Modes and of the Two Modes in his Outlines of Pyrrhonism. I suggest that from these we can derive the basic form of a number of different problems which I refer to as “Agrippan problems”, where this category includes both the epistemic regress problem and the problem of the criterion. Finally, I suggest that there is a distinctive Agrippan problem present at the beginning of Hegel’s Science of Logic.
2020: “On the Incompatibility of Hegel’s Phenomenology with the Beginning of his Logic” Review of Metaphysics 74 (293), pp.81-119
Here I argue that the position taken up at the beginning of Hegel's Logic is constructed in such a fashion that it relies upon the argument of his Phenomenology to justify it. I then offer some support for a view of the relationship between the two texts such as the one supported by Maker in order to see how the two might be thought to be compatible. Finally, in the longest part of the paper, I offer a number of reasons for thinking that attempts to render the two compatible in this fashion fail. I therefore conclude that, as it stands, the beginning of Hegel's Logic is not secured against objection in the way that Hegel wants it to be.
Book Reviews
2023: "Interpreting Hegel's Phenomenology: Expositions and Critique of Contemporary Readings, Ivan Boldyrev and Sebastian Stein (eds.) Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie
2023: "Hegel and the Challenge of Spinoza: A Study in German Idealism, 1801-1831, George di Giovanni" Hegel Bulletin
2022: "Hegel on Being, Stephen Houlgate" Idealistic Studies Vol. 53 Issue 3, pp.297-305
2020: “The Palgrave Hegel Handbook, Marina Bykova and Kenneth Westphal (eds.)” Phenomenological Reviews Vol. 6
2023: "Hegel and the Challenge of Spinoza: A Study in German Idealism, 1801-1831, George di Giovanni" Hegel Bulletin
2022: "Hegel on Being, Stephen Houlgate" Idealistic Studies Vol. 53 Issue 3, pp.297-305
2020: “The Palgrave Hegel Handbook, Marina Bykova and Kenneth Westphal (eds.)” Phenomenological Reviews Vol. 6
Funded Research Projects
2022-2024: "Metametaphysics in German Idealist Philosophy" Humboldt Research Fellowship for Postdocs, University of Freiburg
2022: "Sextus Empiricus and Epistemology's Zetetic Turn" DAAD Short-Term Research Grant, Goethe University Frankfurt
2020-2021: "Scepticism and Presuppositionlessness: Hegel and the Problem of Beginning" IRC Postdoctoral Research Fellowship, University College Dublin
2020: "Scepticism and Infinitism in Sextus and Maimon" Junior Research Fellowship from the DFG-Funded Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies at the University of Hamburg
2022: "Sextus Empiricus and Epistemology's Zetetic Turn" DAAD Short-Term Research Grant, Goethe University Frankfurt
2020-2021: "Scepticism and Presuppositionlessness: Hegel and the Problem of Beginning" IRC Postdoctoral Research Fellowship, University College Dublin
2020: "Scepticism and Infinitism in Sextus and Maimon" Junior Research Fellowship from the DFG-Funded Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies at the University of Hamburg
Talks
2023: "What does it mean to say, of 'thoughts', that they 'used to express the essentialities of things'?" - Universität Leipzig
2023: "Inquiry and the Pyrrhonian Way of Life" Bader College, Queen's University
2022: "Sextus and the Nature of Suspension" Thinking About Suspension: Perspectives on Neutrality - University of Konstanz
2022: "The a priori/a posteriori distinction in Hegel's epistemology of metaphysics" Hegel's Philosophy of Reality - University of Heidelberg
2022: "Bad Scepticism and Democracy" Humanities Society Public Lecture - University of Brighton
2021: "Pyrrhonism and the Nature of Suspension" Varieties of Anti-Skepticism - University of Navarra
2021: "The Scientific Status of Hegel's Logic, its Circular Structure, and the Matter of its Beginning" Hegel 250 Years On: Phenomenology, Logic, and System - University of São Paulo
2020: "From Proto-Sceptic to Sceptic in Sextus' Outlines" Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies - University of Hamburg
2019: "What is the Problem to which Hegel's Concept of "Pure Being" is the Solution?" University of Sussex Philosophy Society - University of Sussex
2018: "Some Reasons for Thinking that the Phenomenology of Spirit Cannot Justify Hegel's Position at the Beginning of his Logic" Absolute Knowing and Presuppositionless Science, International Hegel Work in Progress Seminar - University of Oxford
2018: "The Problem of Beginning as an Agrippan Problem" Graduate Philosophy Conference - University of Sussex
2018: with Tanja Staehler, "Problems of Beginning with Hegel and Husserl" Post-Kantian European Philosophy Seminar, University of Warwick
2017: "Yet Another Look at Hegel's Account of Being, Nothing, and Becoming" Graduate Philosophy Conference - University of Sussex
2017: "Hegel and Scepticism Through the Looking Glass" SEP/FEP 2017 - University of Winchester
2017: "Consummate Scepticism" Graduate Philosophy Conference - University of Sussex
2016: "Pyrrhonian Scepticism and the Beginning of Hegel's Logic" Das Problem des Anfangs, International Forschungsnetzwerk Transzendentalphilosophie/Deutscher Idealismus - University of Southern Denmark
2023: "Inquiry and the Pyrrhonian Way of Life" Bader College, Queen's University
2022: "Sextus and the Nature of Suspension" Thinking About Suspension: Perspectives on Neutrality - University of Konstanz
2022: "The a priori/a posteriori distinction in Hegel's epistemology of metaphysics" Hegel's Philosophy of Reality - University of Heidelberg
2022: "Bad Scepticism and Democracy" Humanities Society Public Lecture - University of Brighton
2021: "Pyrrhonism and the Nature of Suspension" Varieties of Anti-Skepticism - University of Navarra
2021: "The Scientific Status of Hegel's Logic, its Circular Structure, and the Matter of its Beginning" Hegel 250 Years On: Phenomenology, Logic, and System - University of São Paulo
2020: "From Proto-Sceptic to Sceptic in Sextus' Outlines" Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies - University of Hamburg
2019: "What is the Problem to which Hegel's Concept of "Pure Being" is the Solution?" University of Sussex Philosophy Society - University of Sussex
2018: "Some Reasons for Thinking that the Phenomenology of Spirit Cannot Justify Hegel's Position at the Beginning of his Logic" Absolute Knowing and Presuppositionless Science, International Hegel Work in Progress Seminar - University of Oxford
2018: "The Problem of Beginning as an Agrippan Problem" Graduate Philosophy Conference - University of Sussex
2018: with Tanja Staehler, "Problems of Beginning with Hegel and Husserl" Post-Kantian European Philosophy Seminar, University of Warwick
2017: "Yet Another Look at Hegel's Account of Being, Nothing, and Becoming" Graduate Philosophy Conference - University of Sussex
2017: "Hegel and Scepticism Through the Looking Glass" SEP/FEP 2017 - University of Winchester
2017: "Consummate Scepticism" Graduate Philosophy Conference - University of Sussex
2016: "Pyrrhonian Scepticism and the Beginning of Hegel's Logic" Das Problem des Anfangs, International Forschungsnetzwerk Transzendentalphilosophie/Deutscher Idealismus - University of Southern Denmark